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Decomposable Penalty Method
for Generalized Game Problems
with Joint Constraints
I.V. Konnov
1
Abstract
We consider an extension of a noncooperative game problem where players
have joint binding constraints. In this case, justification of a generalized equilib-
rium point needs a reasonable mechanism for attaining this state. We suggest to
combine a penalty method together with shares allocation of right-hand sides,
which replaces the initial problem with a sequence of the usual Nash equilibrium
problems together with an upper level variational inequality as a master prob-
lem. We show convergence of solutions of these auxiliary penalized problems to
a solution of the initial game problem under weak coercivity conditions.
Key words: Noncooperative games, joint constraints, generalized equilib-
rium points, decomposable penalty method, variational inequality.
1 Introduction
Noncooperative games with joint (binding) constraints date back to early works [1]–
[5] and these problems are investigated in many recent works; see e.g. [6]–[8] and the
references therein. Let us consider the generalized l-person noncooperative game, where
the i-th player has its particular strategy set Xi ⊆ R
ni and a payoff (utility) function
fi : X → R with
X = X1 × . . .×Xl, n =
l∑
i=1
ni.
Besides, all the players together with the above utility functions and strategy sets have
the joint constraint set
Y =
{
x ∈ Rn
l∑
i=1
hi(xi) ≤ b
}
,
where x = (x1, . . . , xl)
⊤, hi(xi) = (hi1(xi), . . . , him(xi))
⊤, hij : R
ni → R, j = 1, . . . , m,
i = 1, . . . , l are given functions, b ∈ Rm is a fixed vector in Rm, as an addition to the
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set X . That is, they have the common feasible set
D = X
⋂
Y, (1)
A point x∗ = (x∗1, . . . , x
∗
l )
⊤ ∈ D is said to be an equilibrium point for this game, if
fi(x
∗
−i, yi) ≤ fi(x
∗) ∀(x∗−i, yi) ∈ D, i = 1, . . . , l; (2)
where we set (x−i, yi) = (x1, . . . , xi−1, yi, xi+1, . . . , xl). The usual noncooperative game
corresponds to the case D = X , then (2) is equivalent to the well known Nash equi-
librium concept. Examples of applications of generalized noncooperative games with
joint constraints can be e.g. found in [6, 9, 7, 10, 11]. The main question consists in
implementation of this constrained equilibrium concept within the custom noncooper-
ative framework, where players are independent and make their choices simultaneously.
In fact, the presence of the binding constraints requires certain treaties or concordant
actions of the players, thus contradicting the above assumptions. These drawbacks
were noticed and discussed e.g. in [5, 12, 8].
Rather recently, the right-hand side decomposition approach was suggested for vari-
ational inequalities with binding constraints in [13]. Its extension to generalized nonco-
operative games was given in [11]. Within this approach, the initial problem is treated
as a two-level one by using a share allocation procedure, which leads to a set-valued
variational inequality as a master problem. In [11], a usual noncooperative game prob-
lem is solved at the lower level. Further, a decomposable dual regularization (penalty)
method that deals with a single-valued approximation of the master problem for each
fixed share allocation was suggested. Application of this method for production prob-
lems with common pollution regulation was described in [14].
In this paper, we suggest to apply a direct decomposable penalty method to gen-
eralized noncooperative games, which involve share allocation variables. We show
convergence of solutions of auxiliary penalized problems to a solution of the initial
problem under weak coercivity conditions. Besides, the implementation of this method
enables one to solve each auxiliary penalized problem as a two-level one with the usual
Nash equilibrium problem at the lower level.
2 Decomposition via Shares Allocation
We first fix our basic assumptions.
(A1) Each strategy set Xi ⊆ R
ni is convex and closed and each utility function fi
is concave in its i-th variable xi and continuous for i = 1, . . . , l. Also, hij : R
ni → R,
j = 1, . . . , m, i = 1, . . . , l are convex functions, and the common feasible set D is
nonempty.
Following the Nikaido-Isoda approach from [15], we consider the normalized equi-
librium problem (EP for short) of finding a point x∗ = (x∗1, . . . , x
∗
l )
⊤ ∈ D such that
Φ(x∗, y) ≥ 0 ∀y ∈ D, (3)
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where
Φ(x, y) = Ψ(x, x)−Ψ(x, y), Ψ(x, y) =
l∑
i=1
fi(x−i, yi);
its solutions are called normalized equilibrium points. From the above assumptions it
follows that Φ : X ×X → R is an equilibrium bi-function, i.e., Φ(x, x) = 0 for every
x ∈ X , besides, Φ(x, ·) is convex for each x ∈ X and Φ(·, ·) is continuous. It should
be noted that (3) implies (2). In other words, each normalized equilibrium point is
a generalized Nash equilibrium point, but the reverse assertion is not true in general.
But in case D = X , (2) and (3) become equivalent. We take a suitable coercivity
condition and obtain the existence result from [16, Theorem 3.1].
For a function µ : Rn → R and a number r, we define the level set
Br = {x ∈ X | µ(x) ≤ r}.
We say that the function µ : Rn → R is weakly coercive with respect to the set X ⊆ Rn
if there exists a number r such that the set Br is nonempty and bounded.
(C1) There exist a lower semicontinuous and convex function µ : X → R, which is
weakly coercive with respect to the set D, and a number r, such that, for any point
x ∈ D \Br there is a point z ∈ D with
min{Φ(x, z), µ(z)− µ(x)} < 0 and max{Φ(x, z), µ(z)− µ(x)} ≤ 0.
Proposition 1 If (A1) and (C1) are fulfilled, then problem (3) has a solution.
After proper specialization of the inequalities in (C1) we can somewhat strengthen
the above assertion.
(C2) There exist a lower semicontinuous and convex function µ : X → R, which is
weakly coercive with respect to the set D, and a number r, such that, for any point
x ∈ D \Br there is a point z ∈ D with
µ(z) ≤ µ(x) and Φ(x, z) < 0.
Corollary 1 If (A1) and (C2) are fulfilled, then problem (3) has a solution, and all
the solutions are contained in D
⋂
Br.
These coercivity conditions (C1) and (C2) clearly hold if D (or X) is bounded.
Then we can take µ(x) = ‖x‖ and choose r large enough so that D ⊂ Br.
Let us now introduce the set of partitions of the right-hand side common constraint
vector b:
U˜ =
{
u ∈ Rml
l∑
i=1
ui = b
}
.
where u = (u1, . . . , ul)
⊤, ui ∈ R
m, i = 1, . . . , l. Here ui determines the share of the i-th
player.
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Given a partition u ∈ U˜ , we can consider the parametric EP: Find a point x(u) =
(x1(u), . . . , xl(u))
⊤ ∈ D(u) such that
Φ(x∗, y) ≥ 0 ∀y ∈ D(u), (4)
where
D(u) = D1(u1)× . . .×Dl(ul),
Di(ui) = {xi ∈ Xi hi(xi) ≤ ui}, i = 1, . . . , l. Clearly, (4) is equivalent to the
parametric Nash equilibrium problem (NEP):
fi(x−i(u), yi) ≤ fi(x(u)) ∀yi ∈ Di(ui), i = 1, . . . , l. (5)
If all the optimal shares ui, i = 1, . . . , l of players are known, the constrained prob-
lems (2) and (3) reduce to NEPs. Hence, it seems worthwhile to insert an additional
upper control level for finding the optimal shares. In optimization, this approach is
known as the right-hand side (Kornai-Liptak) decomposition method; see [17].
Following this approach we notice that under certain regularity condition system (5)
can be replaced with the corresponding system of primal-dual optimality conditions:
Find a pair (x(u), v(u)) ∈ X × Rml+ such that
fi(x(u))− fi(x−i(u), yi)
+〈vi(u), hi(yi)− hi(xi(u))〉 ≥ 0 ∀yi ∈ Xi, (6)
〈ui − hi(xi(u)), vi − vi(u)〉 ≥ 0, ∀vi ∈ R
m
+ , (7)
for i = 1, . . . , l;
where v(u) = (v1(u), . . . , vl(u))
⊤. In this system the first relations (6) are rewritten
equivalently as
Φ(x(u), y)
+
l∑
i=1
〈vi(u), hi(yi)− hi(xi(u))〉 ≥ 0 ∀y ∈ X. (8)
Clearly, if (x(u), v(u)) solves (6)–(7) or (8), (7), then x(u) is a solution to (4) or (5).
We denote by T (u) the set of all the solution points −v(u), creating the image of
the set-valued mapping T . This enables us to define the variational inequality (VI):
Find a point u∗ ∈ U˜ such that
∃t∗ ∈ T (u∗), 〈t∗, u− u∗〉 ≥ 0, ∀u ∈ U˜ . (9)
Then it was shown in [11, Theorem 4.1] that just the master VI (9) yields the optimal
shares of common constraints among players.
Proposition 2 Suppose (A1) is fulfilled. If a point u∗ solves VI (9), the corresponding
point x(u∗) in (6)–(7) is a solution of problem (1),(3).
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We conclude that VI (9) related to the parametric problems (4) or (5) enables us
to find a solution to the initial generalized noncooperative game. Hence, the two-level
procedure gives a suitable regulation mechanism for these game problems. However,
this approach has clear drawbacks: T (u) can be empty for some feasible partitions, be-
sides, T is set-valued in general, and this fact reduces the number of methods applicable
to solution of VI (9). Therefore, this approach needs certain modifications.
3 Decomposable Penalty Method
We start our description of the approach from the simple transformation of the joint
constraint set Y by inserting auxiliary variables:
Y =
{
x ∈ Rn ∃u ∈ Rml,
l∑
i=1
ui = b, hi(xi) ≤ ui, i = 1, . . . , l
}
,
where u = (u1, . . . , ul)
⊤, ui ∈ R
m, i = 1, . . . , l. These variables ui as above determine a
partition of the right-hand side vector b, i.e. give explicit shares of players. In principle,
some additional reasonable restrictions can be imposed on the shares u, such as ui ≤ b
or/and ui ≥ 0 for i = 1, . . . , l. Hence, we define the set of feasible partitions as follows:
U =
{
u ∈ U0
l∑
i=1
ui = b
}
.
where U0 ⊆ R
ml is a set of these optional additional restrictions such that for each
x ∈ D there exists u ∈ U , hi(xi) ≤ ui, i = 1, . . . , l.
We can now separate the constraints and first consider the auxiliary penalty prob-
lem: Find a pair w(τ) = (x(τ), u(τ)) ∈ X × U , τ > 0 such that
Φτ (w(τ), w) = Φ(x(τ), x) + τ [P (w)− P (w(τ))] ≥ 0 ∀w = (x, u) ∈ X × U, (10)
where
P (w) =
l∑
i=1
Pi(wi),
and each Pi(wi) = Pi(xi, ui) is a general penalty function for the set
Wi = {wi = (xi, ui) ∈ R
ni × Rm hi(xi) ≤ ui} .
We will define these functions as follows:
Pi(xi, ui) = ϕ(hi(xi)− ui), i = 1, . . . , l,
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where ϕ : Rm → R+ is a convex differentiable and isotone function such that
ϕ(v)
{
= 0, if v ≤ 0,
> 0, otherwise.
It follows that
Pi(xi, ui)
{
= 0, (xi, ui) ∈ Wi,
> 0, (xi, ui) /∈ Wi;
for i = 1, . . . , l. We recall that the function ϕ : Rm → R is called isotone, if for any
points u, v, u ≥ v it holds that ϕ(u) ≥ ϕ(v). The most popular and simple choice is
ϕ(v) = 0.5‖[v]+‖
2,
where [v]+ denotes the projection of v onto the non-negative orthant R
m
+ . Then each
penalty function Pi is convex and differentiable for i = 1, . . . , l. We observe that decom-
posable penalty methods were suggested for separable convex optimization problems
in [18, 19].
We now show that problem (10) can be replaced with the following: Find a pair
w(τ) = (x(τ), u(τ)) ∈ X × U , such that
Φ(x(τ), x) + τ
l∑
i=1
〈ϕ′(hi(xi(τ))− ui(τ)), hi(xi)− hi(xi(τ))〉
+τ
l∑
i=1
〈ϕ′(hi(xi(τ))− ui(τ)), ui(τ)− ui〉 ≥ 0 ∀w = (x, u) ∈ X × U. (11)
Let w(τ) solve (11). Then (10) holds due to the convexity of the function ϕ. In fact,
we have
Pi(xi, ui)− Pi(xi(τ), ui(τ)) ≥ 〈ϕ
′(hi(xi(τ))− ui(τ)), hi(xi)− hi(xi(τ))〉
−〈ϕ′(hi(xi(τ))− ui(τ)), ui − ui(τ)〉,
for i = 1, . . . , l, and (11) implies (10).
Conversely, let w(τ) = (x(τ), u(τ)) be a solution of problem (10). Then we can
temporarily set φ(x) = Φ(x(τ), x) and obtain
φ(x)− φ(x(τ)) + τ [P (w)− P (w(τ))] ≥ 0 ∀w = (x, u) ∈ X × U,
i.e. w(τ) is a solution of the optimization problem. Applying now Proposition 4 in [20]
we conclude that w(τ) solves (11).
In turn, problem (11) is clearly equivalent to the system: Find a pair w(τ) =
(x(τ), u(τ)) ∈ X × U , such that
Φ(x(τ), x) + τ
l∑
i=1
〈ϕ′(hi(xi(τ))− ui(τ)), hi(xi)− hi(xi(τ))〉 ≥ 0 ∀x ∈ X, (12)
l∑
i=1
〈ϕ′(hi(xi(τ))− ui(τ)), ui(τ)− ui〉 ≥ 0 ∀u ∈ U. (13)
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We now collect the obtained properties.
Lemma 1 Let the conditions in (A1) be fulfilled. Then problems (10), (11), and
(12)–(13) are equivalent.
Given a point u ∈ Rml, we can solve only problem (12) in x, which is to find
x(u) ∈ X such that
Φ(x(u), x) + τ
l∑
i=1
〈ϕ′(hi(xi(u))− ui), hi(xi)− hi(xi(u))〉 ≥ 0 ∀x ∈ X. (14)
Let X(u) denote the whole solution set of this problem. For each x(u) ∈ X(u) we set
g(u) = (g1(u), . . . , gl(u))
⊤, where gi(u) = −ϕ
′(hi(xi(u))− ui), i = 1, . . . , l. (15)
Thus we can define the mapping value
G(u) = {g(u) | x(u) ∈ X(u)} .
Bearing in mind (13), we now define the VI: Find a point u∗ ∈ U such that
∃g(u∗) ∈ G(u∗), 〈g(u∗), u− u∗〉 ≥ 0, ∀u ∈ U. (16)
Proposition 3 Suppose (A1) is fulfilled.
(i) If a point u∗ solves VI (16), then there exists a point x∗ = x(u∗) ∈ X(u∗) such
that g(u∗) is defined in (15) at u = u∗ and that the pair w∗ = (x∗, u∗) is a solution of
problem (10).
(ii) If a pair w(τ) = (x(τ), u(τ)) is a solution of problem (10), then the point
u∗ = u(τ) solves VI (16).
The assertions follow directly from the definitions and Lemma 1.
The next step consists in replacing problem (14) with the following penalized EP:
Find x(u) ∈ X such that
Φ(x(u), y) + τ
l∑
i=1
(Pi(yi, ui)− Pi(xi(u), ui)) ≥ 0 ∀y ∈ X. (17)
The equivalence of (14) and (17) is proved similarly to Lemma 1. However, (17) is
clearly equivalent to the NEP: Find x(u) ∈ X such that
f˜i(x−i(u), yi) ≤ f˜i(x(u)), ∀yi ∈ Xi, i = 1, . . . , l; (18)
where the i-th player has the penalized utility function
f˜i(x) = fi(x)− τPi(xi, ui); (19)
cf. (2). Therefore, X(u) is now also the whole solution set of NEP (18)–(19) and we
have obtained the basic equivalence result.
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Theorem 1 Suppose (A1) is fulfilled.
(i) If a point u∗ solves VI (16), then there exists a solution x∗ = x(u∗) of NEP
(18)–(19) and g(u∗) is defined in (15) at u = u∗, such that the pair w∗ = (x∗, u∗) is a
solution of problem (10).
(ii) If a pair w(τ) = (x(τ), u(τ)) is a solution of problem (10), then the point
u∗ = u(τ) solves VI (16) and the point x(τ) is a solution of NEP (18)–(19) at u = u(τ).
We conclude that VI (16) related to the parametric NEP (18)–(19) yields a solution
for the penalized game problem. Hence, we have derived another two-level decompo-
sition method for the initial generalized noncooperative game and have to indicate its
preferences over the method of Section 2. First of all we observe that NEP (18)–(19)
has a solution under rather mild assumptions. From Proposition 1 we obtain that this
is the case if (A1) holds and the set X is bounded. Also, we can take a suitable
coercivity condition in the unbounded case.
(C3) There exists a point x˜ ∈ X such that
Φ(xk, x˜)→ −∞ as ‖xk − x˜‖ → ∞;
for any infinite sequence {xk} ⊂ X.
Proposition 4 If (A1) and (C3) are fulfilled, then NEP (18)–(19) has a solution for
each τ > 0.
Proof. It suffices to show that problem (17) has a solution. Set µ(x) = ‖x− x˜‖ and
Φ˜(x, y) = Φ(x, y) + τ [P (y, u)− P (x, u)]
for a fixed u ∈ U . Then
Φ˜(xk, x˜) ≤ Φ(xk, x˜) + τP (x˜, u)→ −∞ as ‖xk − x˜‖ → ∞.
This means that (C3) implies (C1) for problem (17) and the result follows from
Proposition 1. 
For this reason, G(u) is non-empty under usual assumptions even if the set D(u) is
empty. The other preference is that G possesses a strengthened monotonicity property.
Proposition 5 Suppose (A1) is fulfilled, the bi-function Φ is monotone on X × X,
i.e.
Φ(x′, x′′) + Φ(x′′, x′) ≤ 0;
for each pair of points x′, x′′ ∈ X, and the gradientmap ϕ′ is co-coercive with constant
γ, i.e.
〈v′ − v′′, ϕ′(v′)− ϕ′(v′′)〉 ≥ γ‖ϕ′(v′)− ϕ′(v′′)‖2
for all v′, v′′ ∈ Rml. Then the mapping G is co-coercive with constant γ.
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Proof. Take arbitrary points u′, u′′ ∈ Rml and set x′ = x(u′), g′ = g(u′), v′ = h(x′)−u′
and x′′ = x(u′′), g′′ = g(u′′), v′′ = h(x′′)− u′′. It follows from (14) that
Φ(x′, x′′)− τ
l∑
i=1
〈g′i, hi(x
′′
i )− hi(x
′
i)〉 ≥ 0,
Φ(x′′, x′)− τ
l∑
i=1
〈g′′i , hi(x
′
i)− hi(x
′′
i )〉 ≥ 0;
hence
l∑
i=1
〈g′i − g
′′
i , hi(x
′
i)− hi(x
′′
i )〉 ≥ −[Φ(x
′, x′′) + Φ(x′′, x′)]/τ ≥ 0
since Φ is monotone. It follows that
0 ≤
l∑
i=1
〈g′i − g
′′
i , [hi(x
′
i)− u
′
i]− [hi(x
′′
i )− u
′′
i ]〉+
l∑
i=1
〈g′i − g
′′
i , u
′
i − u
′′
i 〉
= −
l∑
i=1
〈ϕ′(v′i)− ϕ
′(v′′i ), v
′
i − v
′′
i 〉+ 〈g
′ − g′′, u′ − u′′〉
≤ −γ
l∑
i=1
‖ϕ′(v′i)− ϕ
′(v′′i )‖
2 + 〈g′ − g′′, u′ − u′′〉
= −γ‖g′ − g′′‖2 + 〈g′ − g′′, u′ − u′′〉,
therefore, G is co-coercive with constant γ. 
It is well-known that the gradientmap of a convex differentiable function is co-
coercive with constant γ if it satisfies the Lipschitz condition with constant 1/γ; see
e.g. [21, Chapter I, Lemma 6.7]. It follows that the mapping G is then single-valued
even if this is not the case for the mapping u 7→ X(u). The assertion of Proposition 5
holds true if we replace the monotonicity of the bi-function Φ with the more general
monotonicity property of the mapping F defined by taking the sub-differential in y for
Φ(x, y), i.e.,
F (x) =
∂Φ(x, y)
∂y
∣∣∣∣
y=x
;
and following the lines of Proposition 7.2 in [11]. Proposition 5 shows that VI (16)
admits more efficient solution methods in comparison with VI (9); see e.g. [11, 21].
We observe that the equivalent transformations from (10) to (11) and (16)–(17) are
crucial for the decomposable penalty method. The solution concept based on (16)–(17)
has a rather simple and natural interpretation. A system regulator chooses first the
penalty parameter τ . Afterwards, he/she determines the right share allocation vector
u(τ) by sending some trial vectors u to players and announcing particular deviation
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penalty functions, the players then make proper corrections of their utility functions
and determine the corresponding Nash equilibrium point for each trial vector. Then the
system regulator changes the penalty parameter etc. Application of the other known
iterative solution methods to the above generalized game problems was analyzed in
[11]. They include in particular the usual penalty methods. It appeared that imple-
mentation of these mechanisms within a noncooperative game framework may meet
serious difficulties; see [11] for more details.
4 Convergence of the Penalty Method
In this section, we intend to substantiate the penalty method with the auxiliary problem
(10) (or (11)). First we take the following coercivity condition for EP (10).
(C4) There exist a lower semicontinuous and convex function η : X × U → R, which
is weakly coercive with respect to the set X × U , and a number r, such that, for any
point w = (x, u) ∈ (X × U) such that η(w) > r there is a point w′ = (z, v) ∈ (X × U)
with
η(w′) ≤ η(w) and Φτ (w,w
′) < 0.
We note that (C4) is a clear adjustment of condition (C2). For brevity, we define
the level set
Er = {w = (x, u) ∈ (X × U) | η(w) ≤ r}.
Lemma 2 Let the conditions in (A1) and (C2) be fulfilled for some τ > 0. Then
problem (10) has a solution, and all the solutions are contained in (X × U)
⋂
Er.
The assertion follows from Corollary 1.
However, condition (C4) is not suitable for verification (cf. (C3)) and we will
deduce it from other conditions of form (C2). In general, we follow the approach from
[16]. First we consider the case where the set U is bounded.
(C5) There exist a lower semicontinuous and convex function µ : X → R, which is
weakly coercive with respect to the set X, and a number r, such that, for any point
x ∈ X \Br there is a point z ∈ D with
µ(z) ≤ µ(x) and Φ(x, z) < 0.
Theorem 2 Suppose that (A1) and (C5) are fulfilled, the set U is bounded, the se-
quence {τk} satisfies
{τk} ր +∞. (20)
Then:
(i) EP (3) has a solution;
(ii) EP (10) has a solution for each τ > 0 and all these solutions belong to Br×U ;
(iii) Each sequence {w(τk)} of solutions of EP (10) has limit points, all these limit
points belong to (Br
⋂
D)× U and are solutions of EP (3).
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Proof. We first show that, for any τ > 0, (C4) is true with η(w) = µ(x). Take any
w = (x, u) ∈ (X × U) \ Er, then by (C5) there is z ∈ D, µ(z) ≤ µ(x) such that
Φ(x, z) < 0. Since z ∈ D, there exists v ∈ U such that P (w′) = P (z, v) = 0 and we
have
Φτ (w,w
′) = Φ(x, z) + τ [P (w′)− P (w)] ≤ Φ(x, z)− τP (w) < 0.
Hence, assertion (ii) follows from Lemma 2.
For brevity, we set wk = w(τk) = (x
k, uk), where xk = x(τk) and u
k = u(τk). By
(ii), the sequence {wk} exists and is bounded. Therefore, it has limit points. Since Br
is convex and closed, all these limit points must belong to Br × U . Let w¯ = (x¯, u¯) be
an arbitrary limit point of {wk}, i.e. {wks} → w¯. Then, by definition,
0 ≤ P (wks) ≤ τ−1ks Φ(x
ks , x) + P (x, u), ∀(x, u) ∈ X × U.
Taking (x, u) ∈ D × U such that P (x, u) = 0 and using (20), we obtain
0 ≤ P (w¯) ≤ lim inf
s→∞
P (wks) ≤ lim sup
s→∞
[
τ−1ks Φ(x
ks , x)
]
≤ 0,
i.e. P (w¯) = 0 and x¯ ∈ D. Therefore, for each x ∈ D we can take u ∈ U such that
P (w) = P (x, u) = 0 and obtain
Φ(xks , x)− τksP (w
ks) = Φ(xks , x) + τks
[
P (w)− P (wks)
]
≥ 0.
It now follows that
Φ(x¯, x) ≥ lim sup
s→+∞
Φ(xks , x) ≥ lim sup
s→+∞
[
τksP (x
ks)
]
≥ 0.
Therefore x¯ solves EP (3) and assertion (iii) is true. Since x¯ exists, assertion (i) is also
true. The proof is complete. 
We now give similar properties in the unbounded case.
Theorem 3 Suppose that (A1) and (C5) are fulfilled, the sequence {τk} satisfies con-
dition (20). Then:
(i) EP (3) has a solution;
(ii) There exists τ ′ > 0 such that EP (10) has a solution for each τ > τ ′ and all
these solutions belong to Er
⋂
(X × U) where η(w) = max{µ(x), P (w)};
(iii) Each sequence {w(τk)} of solutions of EP (10) has limit points, all these limit
points belong to (Br
⋂
D)× U and are solutions of EP (3).
Proof. We first show that the function η(w) = max{µ(x), P (w)} is weakly coercive
with respect to the set X × U . Fix a number r such that the set Er
⋂
(X × U) is
nonempty. If it is unbounded, there exists a sequence {wk} such that wk = (xk, uk) ∈
Er
⋂
(X × U) such that ‖wk‖ → ∞ as k → ∞. Since the function µ(x) is weakly
coercive with respect to the set X , we have ‖xk‖ ≤ C ≤ ∞. It follows that ‖uk‖ → ∞.
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Since u ∈ U , there exists at least one pair of indices j and t such that uksjt → −∞ for the
corresponding subsequence {uks}, hence Pj(x
ks
j , u
ks
j )→ +∞, which is a contradiction.
We now show that there exists τ ′ > 0 such that (C4) is true for any τ > τ ′. Take
any w = (x, u) ∈ (X × U) \ Er, then η(w) > r. If µ(x) > r, then by (C5) there is
z ∈ D, µ(z) ≤ µ(x) such that Φ(x, z) < 0. Since z ∈ D, there exists v ∈ U such that
P (w′) = P (z, v) = 0 and we have
Φτ (w,w
′) = Φ(x, z) + τ [P (w′)− P (w)] ≤ Φ(x, z)− τP (w) < 0.
Hence, (C4) holds. If µ(x) ≤ r, then P (w) > r. Fix a point z ∈ D, then there exists
v ∈ U such that P (w′) = P (z, v) = 0. Since the set Br is bounded, we have
max
x∈Br
Φ(x, z) = d <∞.
Take any τ ′ = d/r, then
Φτ (w,w
′) = Φ(x, z) + τ [P (w′)− P (w)] ≤ d− τr < 0
if τ > τ ′. Hence, (C4) also holds and assertion (ii) follows from Lemma 2. Assertions
(iii) and (i) are proved as in Theorem 2. 
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